#### Introduction

The Conservators' attacks on the existence and circumstances of the contract merely bring to the fore the need for testimony by Britney Spears. Consider the following:

- Was the management contract the result of undue influence, or did Britney wield the power and "go shopping" for Plaintiff's services? Plaintiff contends it was the latter – she solicited Plaintiff to become her manager. Britney's testimony would have been decisive on this question.
- Was Britney's will overcome by a "Svengali," or did she entice
   Plaintiff into rendering services 24 hours a day for months on end
   without paying for it? Once again, Britney's testimony would
   have been critical on this issue.

"Managers typically get from 15% to 20% of [the artist's] earnings, with the majority getting 15%." If allowed to testify, Plaintiff's expert witness would have relied on and cited this excerpt from Donald S. Passman's widely-used treatise.

If Britney had testified, she would have explained the reason why she offered Mr. Lutfi a 15% management fee is because she knows, from long experience, that is the industry-standard. Since Britney's testimony would have eliminated the need for expert testimony on that point, and the rejection of Plaintiff's expert witness came as a surprise, if the Court has any doubt the 15% management fee was fair and consistent with industry standards, then Plaintiff requests a reopening of Plaintiff's testimony to establish that Britney made statements showing, inter alia, that she was aware that 15% was the most common management fee in the music industry. See, Charles C.

Chapman Building Co. v. California Mart (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 846, 858.

See, Exhibit 13A at 28

#### A. Alleged Variance From the Pleadings

The Conservators' motion argues a variance from the pleadings based on the date of the contract. Actually, the First Amended Complaint alleged negotiation of the contract in June, 2007 and October, 2007,<sup>2</sup> so the variance is not what the motion claims it is, since Plaintiff's proof was negotiation of an initial contract in June and a revised contract in October.

A variance in pleading a *date* is not material absent proof of actual prejudice to the Defendant. See, <u>State Medical Education Bd. v. Roberson</u> (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 (immaterial whether debt repayment obligation accrued in 1962 or 1966); <u>Waller v. Southern Pac. Co.</u> (1967) 66 Cal.2d 201, 215-216 (date variance immaterial absent proof it actually misled the adverse party in maintaining his action or defense on the merits); <u>Marsh Wall Products, Inc. v. Henry Marcus Bldg. Specialties</u> (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 371, 380 (complaint alleged transactions on July 1, 1954 but proof at trial was transactions occurring March 30, 1954 through May 25, 1954).

As stated in Code of Civil Procedure §469:

"Variance; when material; order for amendment. No variance between the allegation in a pleading and the proof is to be deemed material, unless it has actually misled the adverse party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. Whenever it appears that a party has been so misled, the Court may order the pleading to be amended, upon such terms as may be just."

First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 58-61

A variance as to a date has been held curable by amendment. See, 5 Witkin, California Procedure (5th Ed.), Pleading §1211:

"In Foster v. Keating (1953) 120 C.A.2d 435, 261 P.2d 529, the amendment [to conform to proof] was allowed. . . . The only major change was. . . advancing the date of inception. . . and in characterizing the joint venture agreement as one of the steps taken and devices used by the defendant in accomplishing his plan to misappropriate and convert plaintiff's business and assets to his own use."

See, also, <u>County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 of Los Angeles County v.</u>

<u>County of Kern</u> (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1618:

"A pleading may be amended at the time of trial unless the adverse party can establish prejudice. [Citation.] . . . . A variance between pleading and proof does not justify the denial of an amendment to conform pleading to proof unless the unamended pleading 'misled the adverse party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. [Citations.]"

The variance here is semantic and immaterial. The First Amended Complaint alleged the contract was *negotiated* in June, 2007, an oral contract was made in October, 2007, and performance began in October 2007.<sup>3</sup> Plaintiff's proof is that the initial oral contract was made in June, 2007, performance began in June, 2007, Plaintiff *quit* in September, 2007, then returned to work at Britney's request on October 1, 2007, and the oral contract was revised by amendment on October 13, 2007, with the only

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> First Amended Complaint, ¶¶58-60

significant amendment being an agreement that termination without cause required 90 days notice. If necessary, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the Complaint to conform to this proof.

The Conservators assert a variance from the pleadings but fail to argue materiality and prejudice. As noted above, these are essential elements of a nonsuit motion based on a variance motion.

The Conservators cite <u>Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction</u> (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, but that case is inapposite since it involved an attempt to contradict a Request for Admission. Likewise, the Conservators cite <u>Smith v. Walter E. Heller & Co.</u> (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 259, but that case involved an attempt to contradict a long string of judicial determinations.

To the extent further explanation is required, then Plaintiff's case should be re-opened so Mr. Lutfi can *explain* how he determined the date of the initial contract agreement based on the "paper trail" and his performance of his duties thereunder, namely, his bringing the drug-sniffing dogs into Britney's home on June 13, 2007<sup>4</sup> and taking Britney to see attorney Donald S. Passman and Creative Artists Agency head Kevin Huvane on July 1, 2007.<sup>5</sup>

## B. Alleged Contract Uncertainty

The Conservators assert uncertainty as a defense against the contract, but uncertainty is not a viable defense because of *performance* by Plaintiff. See, Carruth v. City of Madera (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 688, 696 ("Any uncertainty was removed by plaintiff's performance and his request for

Exhibit 14

<sup>5</sup> Exhibit 12

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complete performance by city...."); Fisher v. Parsons (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 829, 836 ("Section 33 of Restatement of the Law of Contracts, page 44, says: 'An offer which is too indefinite to create a contract if verbally accepted, may, by entire or partial performance on the part of the offeree, create a contract."')

The Conservators' uncertainty defense is also contrary to the doctrine of liberal construction. As stated in 1 Witkin, <u>Summary of California Law (10<sup>th</sup> Ed. 2005)</u>, Contracts, § 140:

"To determine that a contract is sufficiently certain to be enforced, the court will liberally interpret laymen's agreements or nontechnical language. In considering expressions of agreement, the court must not hold the parties to some impossible, or ideal, or unusual standard. It must take language as it is and people as they are. All agreements have some degree of indefiniteness and some degree of uncertainty. ... The court must not be overly fearful of error; it must not be pedantic or meticulous in interpretation of expressions. ... If the parties have concluded a transaction in which it appears that they intend to make a contract, the court shall not frustrate their intention, if it is possible to reach a fair and just result, even though this requires a choice among conflicting meanings and the filling of some gaps that the parties have left.' (Rivers v. Beadle (1960) 183 C.A.2d 691, 695, 7 C.R. 170, quoting Corbin; see McIllmoil v. Frawley Motor Co. (1923) 190 C. 546, 549, 213 P. 971 [The law does not favor but leans against the destruction of contracts because of uncertainty; and it will, if feasible, so construe agreements as to carry into effect the reasonable intentions of the parties if that

can be ascertained']; Masterson v. Sine (1968) 68 C.2d 222, 224, 65 C.R. 545, 436 P.2d 561 [trial judge properly refused to frustrate clear intention by 'an overly meticulous insistence on completeness and clarity of written expression']; Haggerty v. Warner (1953) 115 C.A.2d 468, 472, 252 P.2d 373; Bettancourt v. Gilroy Theatre Co. (1953) 120 C.A.2d 364, 367, 261 P.2d 351; Schomaker v. Osborne (1967) 250 C.A.2d 887, 893, 58 C.R. 827; 1 Corbin (Rev. ed.), §4.1; 1 Williston 4th, §4:18; 17A Am.Jur.2d (2004 ed.), Contracts §181 et seq.)"

The initial contract of June, 2007, had no term but all that means is that it was terminable at will. See, <u>Unterberger v. Red Bull North America</u>, <u>Inc</u>. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 414, 420 (contract of indeterminate length terminable at will); <u>Ravel v. Hubbard</u> (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 255, 259 ("Where a contract is terminable at will, liability attaches for breaches occurring prior to the termination of the contract.")

### C. Alleged Undue Influence

Plaintiff is disadvantaged in proving the absence of undue influence because he was not allowed to depose nor call Britney Spears as a witness, and her testimony would have negated the undue influence charge. Had he been allowed to call her, Britney's testimony would have established, inter alia, that (a) Britney proposed the artist/manager relationship at a time when she had fired everybody and she needed management; (b) Britney offered the 15% rate of compensation because she knew it was within industry norms and she wanted Plaintiff's services during a relatively low-earning period in her life; (c) Britney breached the agreement by using drugs, then requested

that Plaintiff return and resume his duties after he quit; (d) Britney knew that being able to terminate the relationship on relatively short notice (90 days) meant she could adjust the rate of compensation in the event she went on tour and generated a lot of income. All she had to do was terminate 90 days before the tour and renegotiate a lower rate.<sup>6</sup>

Since Britney was the *offeror* in June, 2007, and the agreement was made at arms-length, there was no undue influence. See, e.g., <u>Setzer v. Robinson</u> (1962) 57 Cal.2d 213, 216-217 (undue influence does not apply to initial agreement). See, also, In re <u>Marriage of Bonds</u> (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 27.

To prove undue influence, the Conservators must prove that Plaintiff was in a "dominant and controlling position" in the transaction. Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1161 n.9. In fact, the opposite was true, since Britney had the money and power and Mr. Lutfi had neither. A review of the videos of Britney browbeating and cursing at Plaintiff – and ordering him around – establishes who was actually in the "power" position in the relationship.<sup>7</sup>

Earlier in the case the Conservators contended that Britney lacked the capacity to contract, but they *abandoned* that defense when Plaintiff sought to conduct an Independent Medical Examination.

On October 30, 2012, the date Plaintiff sought to "call" her to testify, Britney Spears made an appearance on the *Tonight Show*. This was in addition to her regular job as a judge on the television program *X Factor*.

Exhibits 61, 62

## E. Quantum Meruit

Plaintiff elected not to pursue the quantum meruit cause of action to focus the case on enforcing the express contract. As such, that aspect of the nonsuit motion is moot.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: November 1, 2012

JOSEPH D. SCHLEIMER ATTORNEY AT LAW

Joseph D. Schleimer, Attorney for Plaintiff Sam Lutfi

# Lutfi v Spears--Response to Conservators' Motion for Nonsuit

From: Joseph Schleimer (schleimerlaw@msn.com)

Sent: Thu 11/01/12 12:53 AM

To: LASC Department 71 (smcdept71@lasuperiorcourt.org)

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OPP--Mtn Nonsuit by Conservators in loco Britney Spears.pdf (4.3 MB)

#### Kathleen Tollack Clerk, Department 71

Dear Ms. Tollack:

Attached please find Plaintiff's responses to the nonsuit motions filed by the Conservators.

As per your instructions in a previous email, I will file the "blue ink" originals in Room 102.

Very truly yours,

## Joseph D. Schleimer Attorney at Law

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